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CAPITAL REPORT

## Background on Syrian Crisis

By FULTON LEWIS, Jr.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 27.— The Syrian crisis has sparked new life in the Senate's Internal Security Subcommittee investigations, in spite of muzzling efforts by Mr. Dulles' State Department,

The key figure is Robert Cald The key figure is Robert Caldawell Strong, who is left as charge d'affaires in the Damas-cus embassy, after three other members of the staff were expelled on phony charges by the new Red government.

Strong has a talent for being present when governments fall to Communism. He was highlarge in China, too, when the Communists took over the

Communists took over the mainland, and he moved to Formoss when the Chiang government made its withdrawal in December, 1949.

When he showed up in the topside of the Damascus embassy in July of 1954, with John K. Emerson, one of the old China intrigue boys; as his opposite number in next-door. Lebanon, committee attention perked high. They called Emerson to Washington and involved. son to Washington and involved him in the case of Canadian diplomat E. Herbert Norman, who was in nearby Cairo until ne committed suicide.

The State Department brought immediate and heavy pressure, and when committee chairman James Eastland resisted, they operated through the Senate Democratic leadership. The committee was threatened with a cut-off of funds, if the subject was pursued further.

THE SPOTLIGHT turned to Strong when Admiral Charles Maynard Cooke, chief of staff to Admiral King during lite



GEN. MacARTHUR He was worried.

war, a previous witness, told of Strong's activities on Formosa

Admiral. Cooke said Strong used the embassy in Formosa as a sounding board for highly. demoralizing predictions of doom, and false reports about the performance of the Nationalist armies When Admiral Cooke, who was present in the evacuation operations, questioned the accuracy of the statements, Strong said he preferred to uccept his own intelligence infor-

General MacArthur, in Tokyo, was worried over Strong's reports. He sent his persional intelligence officer to Formosa, Brig. Gen. Louis Portler, to find out whether his flank tulght bein danger of being typosed. Strong refused to itsing the formeral Fortier on the higher, beneral Fortier fulfilled bls bussess only 

by making an unauthorised aight landing without Strong's knowledge.

In the light of all these facts, committee counsel Robert Mor-ris wanted to call in Strong for questioning about the Middle Eastern situation, and possibly forestall trouble there. He made inquiries at the State Department, met further resistance, in desperation, he went to Chairman Eastland and threatened to resign, if the Dulles hamstringing was to continue.

Eastland, who doesn't intimi-date easily, told him to go ahead with the Strong investigation and he would take care of the pressure and the funds.

MORRIS went back to the unfill he was recalled to Washington because of antagonism to Chiang.

State Department, insisted that Strong be recalled for intestioning as of August 15, but was several weeks ago.

The Department said that this would be very ind eveni-ent, because the ambassail to Syria, James S. Moose, Jawhas been in this country for type months and Strong was nearly in Damascus. They said, https://dx. ever, that he was due to return to Washington September III, and could testify at that time.

Morris agreed, although it meant that committee members would have to return to With ington during the recess to callduct the hearings. As of the August 15th date, the Red \$15s. over of Syria was under full, and the expulsions from the U. S. Embassy in Syria 14 100 in progress, leaving Robert 12. The committee, however,

insists that he appear on tember 15.

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